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In this paper we analyse data on the rates of return of investment projects sponsored by three 
international institutions: the European Union, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the World Bank. The focus of the paper is on the evaluation of the variability of 
ex-ante economic rates of return, of financial rates of return and ex-post or re-estimated 
economic rates of return. We propose a framework of analysis of rates of return variations 
across projects, sectors, financing institutions, of the wedge between economic and financial, 
and of the gap between ex-ante and ex-post returns. In principle the same framework could be 
used for comparing rates of return variability of development projects across countries, time of 
approval or exit, or other relevant sampling criterion. We discover a pattern of variations across 
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In this paper we analyse data on the rates of return of investment projects sponsored by three 
international institutions: the European Union, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
the World Bank. The focus of the paper is on the evaluation of the variability of ex-ante economic rates 
of return, of financial rates of return and ex-post or re-estimated economic rates of return. We propose a 
framework of analysis of rates of return variations across projects, sectors, financing institutions, of the 
wedge between economic and financial, and of the gap between ex-ante and ex-post returns. In principle 
the same framework could be used for comparing rates of return variability of development projects 
across countries, time of approval or exit, or other relevant sampling criterion. We discover a pattern of 
variations across sectors. And we find that cost-benefit analysis generates larger variability of rates of 





At any given time, all around the world, thousands investment projects proposals come 
under scrutiny by decision-makers. If concerned parties will appraise them as   
technically feasible and financially profitable, they will be implemented. Some projects 
will be a success, others a failure. While most projects are purely private, a subset of 
them will be co-financed, directly or indirectly, by public funds. Many investment 
projects, particularly infrastructures, will be considered for financing exclusively by 
governments or by international organizations, particularly in developing countries, 
transition economies, regions lagging behind within developed economies. 
 
In this paper we analyse variations of the rate of return of development projects 
sponsored by three international institutions: the European Union (EU), the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the World Bank (WB).  
 
The three institutions widely differ in their objectives, geographical scopes, project 
selection processes, etc. However they share a broad committment to development a. 
Each of them has a different geographical coverage, respsctively less developed regions 
in Western Europe (EU), Centre-Eastern Europe (EBRD), less developed countries 
worlwide (WB). This offers an interesting opportunity for an international comparison 
of rates of return of development projects. 
 
The focus of the paper is on the variability of ex-ante economic rate of returns (ERR), 
of financial rates of return (FRR, available for EU and EBRD) and ex-post or re-
estimated economic rates of return (RERR, available for WB only). We propose a 
framework of analysis of FRR and ERR variations across projects, sectors, financing 
institutions, of the wedge between ERR and FRR, and of the gap between ERR and 
RERR
1. In principle the same framework could be used for comparing rates of return 
variability of development projects across countries, time of approval or completion, or 
other relevant sampling criterion. 
 
                                                 
1 In principle we would like to consider also the difference between ex-ante and ex-post FRRs, but the 
data are not avalaible.   3
The basic idea is to consider project rates of return as signals for decision making, 
determined by unknow variables, including true structural parameters and measurement 
errors. Thus we consider the data as the results of experiments, and we treat them 
accordingly. The information we extract allows to distinguish between variations in rate 
of return determined by project-specific factors (including forecasting or data collection 
and elaboration errors) and sector-specific or source-specific factors. Further analysis 
may then distinguish between true structural economic factors and systematic bias at 
appraisal or evaluation level: this was not attempted here, but some examples are given 
on how to use rates of return variability as the starting point for this more in depth 
review of the appraisal process as advocated by Gramlich (1994), Isham, Kaufmann 
(1999).  
Our research points not so much on rates of return values in themselves, but on 
analytical issues arising when one considers cumulative information on them. What we 
envisage, in a nutshell, is an heuristic approach. 
When data of rates of return are regularly collected and sampled in the format of the 
matrix of Fig. 1, the study of variations among the average values by source, sector, 
country, etc. will point directly to the key-issues of development project analysis: why 
are expected financial rates of return in one sector greater than elsewhere? Why is there 
a big difference between financial and economic rates of return in some countries? Why 
in some sectors is there a gap between ex-ante and ex-post rates of return? and so on. 
We do not answer all these questions, but we show how to structure project information 
to explore these issues and we focus on a set of specific propositions based on cost-
benefit analysis principles. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The four project rates of return 
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The paper is in the following sections: first we present  the framework of analysis, then  
a set of testable propositions ; third, we present our sources of data, fourth we discuss 
financial rates of returns, then economic rates of return arising from cost-benefit 
analysis as applied by international organizations, sixth the wedge between FRRs and 
ERRs, seventh RERR data, i.e. the result of ex-post evaluation; eight,  we bring 
together our findings at sectoral level, and propose some interpretations on the pattern 
of variations of rates of return we have detected with our approach; finally, we discuss 
possible implications for project appraisal  by international organizations and for 
further research.  
 
 
1.  Research issues  
   4
Data on the returns of private projects are regularly collected by financial institutions 
and - particularly for projects concerning companies listed in the stock exchange - part 
of the information is relatively easily accessible to external observers, albeit 
imperfectly. In principle, a financial analyst may know how to find data about expected 
and realized profits by sector, by country and for individual companies.  
In contrast to privately financed projects, and in a sense paradoxically, data 
accessibility is often quite limited for projects funded by public money. Obviously, 
most projects that candidate for Government funds will be approved only if they pass 
some kind of test (legal, administrative, financial, socio-economic, political) and  the 
information concerning this process will be recorded somewhere. However, the 
incentives to standardize data, collect them regularly and to make them available to the 
public, are apparently weaker in most Government bodies then they are in the private 
sectors, where data are essential food for investors and financiers. As a consequence, 
public investment data are dispersed among different offices, not well standardized and 
recorded, difficult to access from the outside: a wealth of potentially useful knowledge 
is wasted. Project analysts and decision-makers dealing with capital expenditures in 
important sectors such as water supply, roads, hospitals, just to mention some obvious 
examples, are denied easily accessible comparative information on costs and benefits of 
past decisions.  
Some or most of this waste of information is avoidable. Government bodies and 
international organizations should invest in building project databases. A key-aspect of 
building a project database is the decision on which information should be standardized 
and recorded. In this paper we use data on investment projects financed by three 
international institutions in order to show how, with a minimum amount of information, 
it is possible to learn from experience.  
In principle, we would need financial and economic rates of return, both ex-ante and 
ex- post (thus four sets of data) for each project; a sectoral and country breakdown; 
years of approval and completion; possibly scale indicators (total investment cost and 
employement).  
Financial and economic rates of return, the latter being the result of cost-benefit 
analysis, for infrastructures are relatively easy to calculate. There may be different 
methods and errors in the process of calculating the rate of return of a railway, but if we 
have large samples of projects for which project analysts calculated ex-ante and ex-post 
rates of return, both financial and economic, we may build on this knowledge in order 
to learn systematically from project analysis across countries and sectors.  
It is important to understand that when we observe average values of the rates of return 
of projects approved by an institution what we see is the result of a long chain of 
selection processes. Starting from thousands of potential candidates, only some projects 
will be considered, a part of them will be approved and for just a fraction of them we 
are going to have a record of rates of return . Thus, when we observe statistics on 
project rates of return, we must understand the nature of the sampling process that 
created the observations. 
Suppose we have two universities that potentially draw from two populations of 
candidate students (the two populations may be partially or totally overlapping, or 
entirely different ones). Some potential candidates will not apply, some will apply, but 
they will not be admitted, some of those admitted will never graduate, and some of 
those who will get their degrees, will not find an appropriate job.  
We have information on graduation marks (the ex-ante rates of return) and on job-
histories after graduation (the ex-post data). When we look at the average graduation 
marks and we compare this information for different schools, we may discover that   5
there are variations across schools, but this observations may mean different things. 
Populations of potential candidates may comprise abler types in one case, or a school 
may admit only the best candidates, or it may give too generously graduation marks, 
etc. 
2 
Whatever the reasons for different sample average values, a preliminary test we need to 
check whether we can thrust that the averages reflect different populations (of graduate 
students, of approved projects). This is the starting point for further questions. 
The framework of analysis we propose aims to study the variability of rates of return of 
development projects in such a way as to extract information from large project 
databases. We also show how useful it is collecting and using regularly these data by 
international organizations or national development agencies, and by researchers. 
Finally, let us discuss more broadly the heuristic approach we advocate. Many 
practitioners would subscribe the view that it is difficult or impossible to compare rates 
of return across sectors, (even within one institution), because methods of analysis 
differ. According to Baum, Tolbert (1985), in their reading of World Bank experience 
in project analysis: 
 
“The difficulties of measuring benefits vary a great deal among projects in different sectors, as one 
would expect; they range from problems in determining what the additional outputs produced by 
the project are worth to the economy to problems in assessing what the outputs in fact are. Although 
the general approach is always the same, the exact form that the analysis takes must be tailored to 
the circumstances of each sector.…. Since the measurement of costs and benefits differs from sector 
to sector, it is usually not meaningful to compare project profitability across sectors, and indices 
such as the net present value and the internal rate of return are not a sound yardstick for 
intersectoral resource allocation” 
 
According to the authors projects in agricolture, industry or petroleum projects produce 
output that are generally internationally traded and ERR is consequently a good index 
of economic impact. In contrast, projects in public utilities, such as water and sanitation 
or telecommunications the benefits to consumer may substantially exceed the regulated 
tariffs they pay. For highways and other transport services there are often no tariffs, and 
benefits are based on avoided costs. Moreover for projects in health or education or 
other social infrastructures "no meaningful measures of the monetary benefits exist" 
and the analysis focus on cost-effectiveness. The cited view was reflected by the World 
Bank Operational Manual that uses more or less the same wording to underline 
differences in project analysis across sectors.  
 
However, in this paper we take a more positive attitude and we show that intersectoral 
and international comparisons of the returns of development projects are feasible and 
useful.  
 
It is important to stress the conceptual relationship between rates of return and the more 
general, but more vague, issue of performance. The World Bank since some years has 
redesigned its evaluation system (OED, various years, 1994-2001) in such a way as to 
enlarge the range of indicators used to rate projects. The new system establishes three 
results accounts (outcome, sustainability, institutional development) and two process 
oriented accounts (Bank performance and borrower performance). We are not going 
here to discuss in detail this new system of evaluation. Clearly ERR and RERR 
                                                 
2 For example the World Bank invests in Africa, while Eu and EBRD do not. Africa may be a difficult 
region for project implementation for a number of reasons. Thus expectations and risks of the World 
Bank portfolio will be influenced by its country composition.   6
calculation is just an aspect of it, however we think it would be a mistake to move 
further away from it.  
 
According to OED (1997a, Vol. I, p. 52) in the ‘90s ERR analysis was applied in about 
36% of the projects, down from an average of 58-56% respectively in the '70s and the 
'80s. This trend may be attributed to a shift towards social sector investments and 
technical assistance, but the report advocates a reversal of the trend "with wider 
application of cost-benefit analysis, including the social sectors".  
 
There may be very good reasons in fact to reverse the trend. It seems that according the 
same source projects for which the ERR were calculated perform significantly better 
than the average: "Within the 1995 cohort, of the 95 projects with ERRs at appraisal, 84 
percent were rated satisfactory as compared with the overall average of 68 percent". 
The explanations given by OED points to the role of measurability of physical goals. 
 
Battaile, Candler (1997) explicitly examine and test by econometric analysis the 
hypothesis that carrying out ex-ante the calculation of ERR significantly improves the 
probability that an operation is ex-post rated satisfactory, regardless of the estimated 
ex-ante rate of return itself: they find convincing evidence that it is not the ERR level 
per se that influences the probability of a project to be rated satisfactory at completion, 
(while it is linked to the RERR), but just the fact that an ERR was calculated, perhaps 
thus increasing the knowledge of all involved parties of strenghts and weaknesses of the 
operation.  
 
We suggest that an even greater effectiveness could be gained by calculating always  
FRR and ERR ex ante ed ex post and sampling together these four sets of data. The 
variations across sectors and countries or institutions of the wedge beteween FRR and 
ERR, and between ex-ante and ex-post rates of return may dirive further applied 
analyisis pointing either on the revision of practical methods of appraisal, or of the 
portfolio composition (or both). But also will give project appraisers and decision 
makers the feeling that their work can be effectively evaluated. Thus cumulative 
information of rates of return may offer an incentive to sound appraisal and to better 
development projects. 
 
2. Some testable propositions 
We start our analysis with some simple definitions and propositions.  
Let FRR be the internal rate of return of the project, i.e. the discount rate rate at which a 
stream of costs and benefits has a net present value equal to zero. We can observe 
financial costs and benefits either ex-ante, i.e at time 0, or ex-post, at a convenient time 
t. Thus, for financial profits, i.e. the difference between benefits and costs πf, 
discounted at the rate φ0 by definition it is: 
 
NPV(πf0, φf0)= 0 
NPV(πft, φft)= 0 
In turn, cost and benefits are project inputs (y quantity vector, vector notation omitted) 
and outputs  (x quantity vector)  multiplied by the appropriate price vectors, say py and 
px. 
 
Hence ex ante :  
   7
NPV(πf0, φf0)= 0 implies NPV(x0pxf0 , φf0) = NPV(y0pyf0 , φf0). 
 
The ex-post counterpart of this is simply 
 
NPV(xtpxft , φft) = NPV(ytpyft , φft). 
 
When we move from financial analysis to economic analysis, both ex ante and ex post, 
there we need to substitute observable prices with shadow prices, i.e. the opportunity 
cost of inputs and outputs (Dréze, Stern, 1990). For examples, externalities that have 
zero price in the financial accounts of the project, should be valued with their social 
opportunity costs.  
The economic discount rate (ex-ante or ex post) that zeroes net social benefits, with 
obvious notation,  is the solution of : 
 
NPV(πe, φe)= 0. 
 
We thus have four internal rates of return for any project : φf0 , φft , φe0 , φet  and we 
would like to understand whether  there  are conceptual relationships among these four 
project performance indicators.  
A preliminary remark is that the internal rates of return we can observe are project 
specific. However  they depend upon parameters, namely  
a)  the observable prices (in financial analysis) and shadow prices ( only very large 
projects are not parametric in prices, and we shall ignore this case, that has less 
practical relevance ) 
b)  the input/output coefficients that  are given by the project technology 
 
In turn these parameters are related to the project environment : prices and technologies 
accessible to the investor change with  industries, countries and other factors.  
Suppose now you are an investor or a financier that  wants to select its optimal portfolio 
of projects.  If you are  a private organization, it is reasonable to assume that you want 
to maximize your discounted financial profits. In contrast, if you are an international 
organization devoted to development objectives, you should aim to maximizing the 
discounted economic profits of the projects you select for financing. It is important to 
note here that at this general level it makes no difference in terms of the objective 
function if a development agency finances a projects through a grant or a loan or a 
combination of these sources of funds. However, if you commit funds through loans 
there is an additional costraint: the project  you select for financing should be able to 
pay interest and refund back the loan.  
In this framework the following propositions may offer a way to formalize a set of 




For the project  population or for  a large unbiased  sample of projects optimally 
selected by a development agency  (optimal project portfolio,OPP ), ex-ante and ex-
post internal rates of return , either economic or financial, should be positively 
correlated:                    Ε(φft )= f(φf0 , u),   Ε(φet) = f(φe0 , u). 
 
Here u is a vector of other variables that influence the project performance and that 
were unknown to the evaluator  ex-ante. On average positive and negative deviations   8
from the ex-ante return will compensate  (to a certain extent),  and the ex-ante return is 
a predictor of the ex-post return. Under a systematic optimism bias, however, 
:                    Ε(φft ) <φf0 ,   Ε(φet)<φe0 . 
 
Hence, appropriate data will allow us to measure the extent of optimism bias, and for 
example whether forecasting errors are evenly dispersed across the project potfolio or 
whether they occur more frequently in some countries/sectors. This may be the starting 




An OPP (unconstrained by rationing of  finance) will comprise all the projects with an 
ex ante rate of return higher than a required rate of reurn. Hence, the ex-post rate of 
return will exceed the required of return. 
 
Thius is a well known criterion in cost-benefit analyisis literature. A rational 
development agency (using only information such as φf0,  φe0 ) will determine  a 
threshold φ
*f      and   φ
*e, (based on its respectively financial and social opportunity
 cost 
of capital), and approve only projects when  φf0 > φ
*f    or φe0> φ
*e .  
When we observe that there are systematic deviations from this criterion, for example 
approved projects in one sector or country have often economic returns under the 





For any OPP there should be no systematic differences in average returns across 
sectors and countries. 
 
If  the development agency has no preference over countries (e.g because the shadow 
prices in economic analysis include the distributional characteristics of goods) or 
industries (e.g. because all externality impacts are included in project returns through 
the shadow prices vector),  and the population of candidate projects is large enough, 




The required financial rate of return and the average ex ante and ex post rates of 
return of an OPP for a development agency committed to financing projects through 
lending will be higher than  for an agency  disbursing grants.  
 
While one may think to situations where the opportunity cost of capital is equal for the 





The wedge between   the economic and financial rate of return will be positive for the 
average project in the 0PP:   φe0 − φf0  > 0  , φeτ − φft  > 0     
 
   9
The wedge between  the financial and economic rates of return is different from zero 
when  observable and shadow price do not coincide. Typically social cost benefit 
analysis introduces corrections to observable input and output prices such that 
 
 
NPV(xtpxf0 ) < NPV(xtpxe0 ) And/or 




Within an OPP the wedge between  economic and financial rate of returns may be 
sector/country specific. 
 
The reason is simple: in some sectors, typically Industry, prices are nearer to 
oppurtunity costs than in monopolistic and heavily regulated sectors, e.g. the public 
utilities. Countries may have varying degrees of price distortions. It is important to 
remark that this does not contradict Proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 7 
For an OPP the variability of ex-ante economic rates of return should not be greater 
than the variability of financial rates of return. 
 
When we consider e.g. the standard deviation of   φe0  and of   φf0   and we compare this 
information, having in mind proposition 5 and 6, we should not expect that economic 
analysis increases returns variability as compared with financial analysis. In fact, the 
transition from observable (distorted) prices to economic prices may be neutral or even 
decrease returns variability, for example because price discrimination, monopoly prices, 
different duties on imported goods are wiped out by the standard rules for shadow 
pricing. If we observe an increase of standard deviation this may be the starting point 
for understanding whether cost benefit analyisis at project level has mixed up the 
results (for instance with inconsistent shadow pricing). 
 
In the remaining of the paper we test (with the limitation imposed by data availability) 
these propositions (and some of their implications). We are unable to offer a systematic 
statistical analysis, but we show how a new approach, simple and feasible, can be 
implemented to go beyond the skeptical view that cost-benefict analysis of 




As said, there are four sets of basic data we need: financial and economic rates of 
return, both ex-ante and ex post.
3 
 
For the EU we consider a data base of 400 major projects built for the European 
Commission, DG XVI Regional Policies and Cohesion.
4 For the EBRD, we consider 
data on 253 projects, collected by the Office of the Chief Economist and made available 
                                                 
3 FRRs are avalaible for EBRD and EU samples only; ERRs ex post for WB samples only. 
 
4 Start up and first results of this analysis were discussed in Florio (1997). More comprehensive data 
were published in European Commission (1997).   10
for this research. Finally, the World Bank data were extracted by the large database 
built by the Operations Evaluation Department, comprising 2147 projects: for this 
research two smaller samples were extracted by OED in such a way as to match with 
years of approval or implementation, and with sectoral classifications of the other two 
sources (105 World Bank projects approved in fiscal years 1988-97; 336 projects 
completed in years 1990-97). 
 
Our testing procedure is the following: 
 
First, we make simple tests on variances and averages of FRR and ERR (and if 
available also on their ex-post counterparts). These tests are necessary because even if a 
project databases may comprise hundreds of cases, in fact when we spread them across 
sectors (or countries or years of approval or any other key characteristic), we need to 
treat relatively small samples. We calculate confidence intervals for variance and 
average values, and test whether in any comparison these statistics are likely or not to 
reflect structural differences of populations of approved projects (including differences 
in their appraisal or evaluation methods). For checking the averages, we use a simple t-
test ratio, where the upper part of the ratio is just the difference between two sample 
averages and the lower part is a measure of the variability of the variable. The null 
hypothesis is the assumption of equal averages for the two populations of projects. The 
appropriate statistic for testing the hypothesis that the variance are equal is the ratio 
between the sample estimates of the variances. If the null hypothesis is true, this ratio is 
distributed as a probability distribution that depends on the F distribution. 
 
Second, we calculate the wedge between ERR and FRR. A large (small) FRR-ERR 
wedge is an indication of the width of price distortion as appraised by the evaluator. It 
can reflect either an actually large (small) discrepancy between financial and social 
profitability, or systematic error at appraisal level because of some methodological bias. 
 
Third, the comparison between ex-post and ex-ante rates of return, both financial and 
economic, will tell us whether the perhaps unavoidable optimism bias at time of 
appraisal is eavenly distributed across sectors (or cohorts or any other sampling 
criteria). If not, there may be specific reasons. 
 
Fourth, we standardize ERR and FRR across sectors, by using industry as a benchmark. 
This allows us immediately to see systematic differences in financial or economic 
profitability as (imperfectly) reflected by the rates of return. Because all projects have 
been approved, these differences point to methodological issues or policy preferences 
imperfectly included in the appraisal process. 
 
Table 1 presents the samples we use, with a breakdown by sources, sectors and type of 
data. The projects we consider have been approved in the late 80's and have then been 
implemented in recent years or still are in their implementation phase. For the World 
Bank there are also data covering approval years since 1974 and we shall mention some 
of these longer term evidence. 
Geographical coverage is the following: Objective 1 Regions of the European Union 
(particularly the whole of Greece, Portugal, Ireland, most of Spain, the Italian 
Mezzogiorno, the new Länder of Germany, overseas territories of France); Centre-
Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union Republics for EBRD; a large array of less   11
developed countries worldwide, particularly in Asia, Latin America and Africa, for the 
WB. 
 
We consider projects in nine sectors: energy transport and distribution; energy 
production; roads and highways; railways; ports, airports, other transport 
infrastructures; water supply (transport and distribution); forests and natural parks; 
telecommunications; industry and other productive investments. 
 
For each of these sectors we have data for at least two of the three international sources. 
This sectoral selection criteria implies that we do not analyze data for some sectors that 
play an important role for one institution, but not so for the others: this is particularly 
the case of agricolture projects for WB, and for environment protection infrastructures 
for the EU (sewers and depurators, refuse and waste treatment, etc).  
As said, this implies that the data we use cannot be taken as representative of the whole 
project portfolio of each institution. 
 
Total investment costs for most projects we consider may be in the region of USD 15-
50 millions, however there are a number of larger projects, some mega-projects (e.g. 
more than 100 million USD) and some smaller projects. While we have financial data 
for individual projects of the EU and the EBRD, and some average data for WB, the 
inclusion in the research plan data on capital expenditures and of many other potentially 









 WB TOTAL 












Energy transport and 
distribution 
4 3  10 11  14  46 126 14  140 
Energy production  2 3  19 15  19  65 187 21  205 
Roads and highways  12 91  5  15  34  78  337  17 443 
Railways and 
underground  
34 47  5  7  3  14  77  39 131 
Ports, airports   9 14 6  1  6  27  95  15  110 
Water supply, transport 
and distribution 
10 23 13  1  4  28  98  23 122 
Telecommunication 
infrastructures 
.. ..  29 18  8  22  86 29  104 
Industries and other 
productive investments 
64 2 83 40  10  25  104 147  146 
Overall sample  135 183 170  108  98  305  1,110  305 1,401 
Notes:   (1) Approval years 1988-1996 
  (2) Approval years 1992-1996 
  (3) EU + EBRD 
  (4) EU + EBRD + WB(c) 
  (a) Approval years 1988-1997 
  (b) Exit year 1990-1997   12
  (c) All evaluated projects 1974-1997. 
 
 
It is important to underline a crucial institutional difference between EU projects on one 
side and EBRD or WB ones on the other side: while the former are supported by grants 
disbursed by a non-financial institution, the latter are loans disbursed by international 
banks. Moreover both EBRD and WB adopt a rate of return threshold of 10% for 
project proposals, while this is not the case for EU. However, the three institutions are 
all international bodies backed by governments, and are involved in and commmitted to 
development policies. They use cost-benefit analysis as an aid for project decision-
making in this framework. Thus in spite of important differences a comparison seems 




4. Financial rates of return. 
 
A financial rate of return is the rate that determines a zero net present value of project 
cash flows, evaluated at observed prices. There may be differences in practice on how 
to calculate it (e.g. concerning the project time horizon and its residual value, taxation, 
inflation), but the technique is a fairly standard one, and we have found no evidence of 
systematic differences in financial analysis methods between the sources of our data.  
Tab. A.1 in the Statistical Appendix presents FRR data respectively for EU and EBRD: 
sectoral and total averages, variances, standard deviations, confidence intervals at the 
5% level, coefficients of variation. See Fig.2 for a simple comparison of data from the 
two sources. 
 
A first remark concerns the striking differences in the total sample average FRR: EBRD 
expected average return is two times EU (around 23% against 12.13%). There may be 
three factors that account for most of this wide gap: 
 
a) EBRD uses a 10% cut off rate, i.e. does not consider project whose ex-ante rate of 
return is less than this threshold, while the EU does not have any fixed threshold. As 
mentioned, EBRD disburses loans, and a relatively high ex-ante cut-off rate (the same 
used by the World Bank) may be a way to insure from the risk of default. The EU offers 
grants, and does not face the same kind of risk.  
 
b) EBRD portfolio is influenced by a high number of telecommunications and energy 
projects, many of them being improvements of existing networks, with a high rate of 
return. 
 
c) there may exist structural differences in the tariff policies in Centre-Eastern Europe 
and in Western Europe: EBRD may expect a substantial rise in tariffs for services such 
as transport and water, while this is not the case for EU member states. This may 
explain the wide difference of ex ante ERR also in these sectors. 
                                                 
5 The differences across institutions may be particularly relevant for the FRRs. For example, the EBRD 
must get a commercial rate of return on projects, while obviously this is not the case for the EU. 
Mandate, terms and conditions of finance, the role of rates of return may widely differ across institutions. 
For example the EBRD might sacrifice ERR in the traditional sense, for a project with a high 
"transitional impact". The World Bank, as well, has developed a larger set of indicators and ERR is far 
from being the sole decision criterion. This point is further discussed in the Conclusions. 
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Further analysis is needed to disentangle these possible explanations. 
 
However there are also similarities in relative sectoral expected performances, as Fig.2 
shows: e.g. water and roads are expected to have relatively low performance as 
compared with energy production or airports. 
 
























    and distribution
2. Energy production
3. Roads and highways
4. Railways and underground
5. Ports and airports
6. Water supply, transport and 
    distribution
7.  Industries and other pro- 
    ductive investments
 
 
We shall discuss in greater detail sectoral aspects below. Now we wish simply to check 
whether we can consider the two samples as revealing a structural difference. This can 
be done first by testing the sectoral and overall sample variances; table 2 presents the 
results of this test. We tested the homogeneity of the variances of the EU and EBRD 
total samples and of the single sectors of the two institutions. 











We use F-statistics at 5% level to check for homoschedasticity (Tab. 2) and to use this 
information in the comparison of sample averages. We use the following formula: 













2,  and n1 is the number of 
observations of the sample with the greater variance. 
Under null hypothesis this statistic has distribution F with n1-1 and n2-1 degree of 
freedom. Thus if calculated F is more than a value Fα we reject the null hypotheses, i.e. 
there are significant differences between the variances. 
 
TAB.2 Test for variance of FRR - EU and EBRD 
Sectors  F  Degrees of freedom F(α)  Test results
 n 1-1 n2-1  α=0.05  
Energy transport and distribution  1.8  9  3  8.8  ACC. H0 
Energy production  ∞  18 1  247.0  REJ.  H0 
Roads and highways  1.3  4  11  3.4  ACC. H0 
Railways and underground   3.6  4  33  2.7  REJ. H0 
Ports, airports   1.6  5  8  3.7  ACC. H0   14
Water supply, transport and distribution  2.1  9  12  2.8  ACC. H0 
Industries and other productive investments 2.9  63  82  1.5  REJ. H0 
Overall sample  1.4  134  140  ~1  REJ. H0 
Notes: if we choose to set α=0.01, Η0 is accepted also for sector 4 (Railways and underground). 
 
Results of the test for variance may be used to check the existence of significant 
differences between sample averages. We test the two hypotheses: 
H0 : µ1 = µ2 
H1: µ1 ≠ µ2 
with the statistic X1 −X2 , where Xi is the sample average. 





p   is the 






[2]       Sp
2 =  
n1 −1 ( )S1
2 + n2 −1 ( )S2
2
n1 + n2 − 2  
 
Thus we can use as statistic test the variable: 








that has distribution t of Student with n1+n2-2. 
If the t-value calculated for the groups is greater than t α/2 , we reject the null 
hypothesis. 
For comparison between groups that are heteroschedastic we can not use the same 
statistic because we don’t know anything about the sample variances. In this case we 
can approximate the statistic t with the variable: 
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where ti (i=1,2) is the value tα/2 of the distribution t (ni-1). (Cochran e Cox, 1957). 
Results of the sample average test are reported in Tab.3.  
 
TAB.3 Test for averages of FRR: EU and EBRD. 
Sectors t  Df:  t(α/2)  Test results 
   n 1+n2-2  α=0.05    
Energy transport and distribution  3.55  12  2.18  REJ. H0 
Energy production*  2.10 19  2.09  REJ. H0 
Roads and highways  8.51  15  2.13  REJ. H0 
Railways and underground *  2.75 37  2.03  REJ. H0 
Ports, airports   6.60  13  2.16  REJ. H0 
Water supply, transport and distribution  5.65  21  2.08  REJ. H0 
Industries and other productive investments*  2.00 145  1.97  REJ. H0 
Overall sample*  1.977 274  1.967  1) 
Notes: if we choose to set α=0.01, Η0 is accepted for sector 6 (Water supply, transport and distribution).  
  these sectors are heteroschedastic 
 1)  H0 should be rejected: calculated t is approximatively equal to tα/2   
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There is a clear confirm that the two overall FRR sample averages and all of the 
sectoral FRR average show a statistically significant difference. For example, the 
difference between the higher average financial rate of return of the 83 EBRD industry 
projects (23.16%) as compared with the 63 EU projects (19.59%), while relatively 
small, is likely to reflect true differences in the two project populations. 
 
Because these are ex-ante rates of return, there are two possible (not mutually 
exclusive) interpretations: 
 
a) different systematic forecasting errors, with an optimistic bias higher at EBRD than 
at EU; 
 
b) true differences in project profitability, either depending upon the general conditions 
of the countries that are the targets of investments; or depending upon differences in the 
average quality of the proposals submitted to and approved by the two institutions.  
 
This question may be ascertained by the collection of ex-post FRRs, not yet available 
for the two institutions. However data analysis and comparisons offer a first signal for 
the project monitoring process, because they reveal a significant difference that needs a 
structural explanation. For example EBRD should ask itself wich are the factors that 
determine high expectations, while the EU has to ask itself how it can justify relatively 
low expectations on financial returns in its less developed regions. 
 
 
5. Economic rates of return 
 
There are no major differences in the definition of the economic rate of returns among 
most international organizations and national agencies.
6 However, this wide consensus 
on the ERR concept may conceal differences in practice. A key issue in the definition 
is: how to compute taxes, duties, shadow prices and externalities. Different 
organizations and individual appraisers may follow different rules and shortcuts, and 
obviously different circumstances may imply a different role for the corrections of 
observed prices
7. Thus we have additional sources of variability, that should be added 
to the variability of FRRs.  
 
Tables A.2 in the Statistical Appendix and Tab.4 present ERR data for respectively the 
EU, EBRD and the World Bank. For the latter, we present as said above three different 
samples: the first and smallest one refers to projects approved (and completed) by the 
World Bank since 1988 up to 1997, i.e. in the same time span (appromatively) than the 
other two sources (see the Appendix). It is important to underline that projects 
considered in the WB sample are those included in the OED database and for which 
both ERR and RERR exists. Projects approved, but not completed or not re-evaluated, 
                                                 
6 The EC Guide (1997) has the following definition: "Internal rate of return: the discount rate at which a 
stream of costs and benefits has a net present value of zero" (p. 20) and suggests that "After corrections 
for price distortion and externalities, one has to calculate the economic rate of return" (p. 30).  
The World Bank in a number of publications cited in the bibliography, the European Investment Bank 
(Sarbeck 1990), the British Overseas Development Agency (1988), the OECD (Pearce et al 1994), and 
many national and international other institutions give the same definition. 
7 For example, some projects have been evaluated taking the monetary variables at costant dollars, some 
at current dollars and others in national currency.   16
are then excluded. This contrasts with the other two sources where just approval date 
were considered.  
 
Because of their intrinsic interest, we report data also from two larger samples: all 
projects completed in fiscal years 1990-97 and finally all projects recorded in the OED 
database for which both ERR and RERR exist. Tab. 4 shows that the average values of 
the ERRs across the three sources differ streakingly, both as for the overall samples and 
for most sectors. Again, considering the sample averages, EBRD rates are two times 
higher than those of EU projects, as with FRR, and the World Bank projects lie often in 
between. 
 
TAB.4 Comparison between ERRs average values. 
SECTORS EBDR  WB
1 EU 
Energy transport and distribution  35.73 22.94 14.19 
Energy production  44.48 14.69 11.70 
Roads and highways  23.51 33.34 18.63 
Railways and underground   21.43 25.97 16.68 
Ports, airports   … 23.15  17.43 
Water supply, transport and distribution  25.90 10.68 18.92 
Telecommunication infrastructures  38.56 24.11  ... 
Industries and other productive investments  28.28 26.71  (19.59)
2 
Overall sample  31.82 25.03 17.19 
Notes:    1 projects for fiscal year 88 
2 For EU industries sample we use FRR instead of ERR because we have the economic rate of 
return only for two projects. 
 
However, because of the high variance of the samples and because some sample 
partitions are very small, we wish to test how confident we can be that the average 
differences reflect population differences.  
We think to ex ante ERRs as observations lumped in three samples extracted from the 
same world projects population
8, while we consider sectors as a 9-level factor.  
Then we study variability between the samples and within samples in the following 
way: the total deviation can be considered as the sum of the deviation between the 
groups (SSB) and the deviation within groups (SSW). 
 
[ 5 ]         S S T =SSB+SSW 
 
The ratio of variance between and within groups has distribution F with r-1 and N-r 
degrees of freedom
9. We use this statistics to check the null hypothesis (Tab.5): 
H0  µ1 = µ2 = ... =µr 
against the alternative H1: µι≠ µj for at least one pair of value. With the null hypothesis 
we postulate the null effect of the level factor on the variable. 
 
                                                 
8 In fact the three institutions do not extract random samples from the world project population. However 
we use this as a working hypothesis. When we discover significant variations across the samples, we can 
infer that project populations differ and we can try to understand wich are the causes. 
9 r is the number of factors and N is the total of observations.   17
The results we get are shown in Table 6 and allow us to reject H0 for the case where 
level factors are both the institutions and the sectors. 
 
 
TAB.5 Analysis of variance and components of variance 
Variability sources  Sum of squares  Degrees of freedom Mean squares  F 
Between groups  SSB r-1  SSB/(r-1) 
Within groups  SSW N-r  SSW/(N-r) 
SSB r −1 ()
−1
SSW N − r ()
−1
Total SST N-1     
 
 
TAB 6 Variance analysis.  
  Df Variance  F  F(2,22) α = 0.05  Test result 
Factor is sector
1) 
Between groups  2  396.26  9.06  3.52  REJ. H0 
Within the groups  19  43.73   
Factor is institution
2) 
Between groups  7  1425.57  14.44  2.76  REJ. H0 
Within the groups  14  98.73   
Note:   1) the institutions are the samples of a population and the sectors are the levels of a factor  
 2) sectors are the sample of a population and institution are a factor with three level 
 
 
Moreover, we decompose this general result in three comparisons of pairs of sample 
averages: EU-EBRD, EBRD-WB, EU-WB with the same technique used for FRR. 
Results are shown in Tables A1-7. 
 
The comparison between Tab.3 and Tab.8 for EU and EBRD projects shows that while 
H0  is generally rejected for FRR, it is often accepted for ERR
10.  
These results can be easily explained when we look at the structure of t or F test.  
For the following sectors that are homoschedastic for both FRRs and ERRs we use the t 
test [3]. They are: 
-  Energy transport and distribution 
-  Roads and highways 
-  Ports and airports 
-  Water supply, transport and distribution. 
For these sectors while the FRRs sample averages widely differ between EBRD and 
EU, the weighted sum of sample variances is sufficiently small to allow us to reject H0. 
                                                 
10 Detailed informations on the sample data are in the tables A.1 e A.2. However for tables 3 and 8 we 
have excluded some sectors that does not have a counterpart in the comparison between institutions. The 
recalculated overall sample averages (x ) and standard deviation (s) are:  
  Institution  x   s 
EBRD 23.14  10.80  FRR  EU 12.18  12.90 
EBRD 32.10  17.81  ERR  EU 17.18  11.72 
   18
But for ERRs, while differences in the averages are still big, variances are much bigger 
than for FRRs, and we cannot reject H0.
11 
 
This, we think, is an important result never observed before in project analysis 
literature. We suggest the following interpretation: additional variability of economic 
rates of return as compared with financial rates of returns may be explained by cost-
benefit analysis. In fact, while for financial analysis the techniques and hypothesis are 
fairly standard across sectors, institutions, individual evaluators, cost-benefit analysis in 
practice, is more heterogenous or ad hoc. We cannot further test this but our own 
reading of many published WB reports and of hundreds of unpublished EU and EBRD 




TAB.7 Test for averages of ERR 
Sectors t  Df:      t(α/2) Test  results 
   n 1+n2-2  α=0.05    
EU and EBRD 
Energy transport and distribution  2.65  12  2.18  REJ. H0 
Energy production  2.08  16  2.12  ACC. H0 
Roads and highways  1.37  104  1.99  ACC. H0 
Railways and underground   1.02  52  2.01  ACC. H0 
Industries and other productive investments  1.16  42  2.02  ACC. H0 
Overall sample*  1.967 290  1.968  1) 
EBRD and WB
2) 
Energy transport and distribution  2.51  23  2.07  REJ. H0 
Energy production*  2.14  32  1.98  REJ. H0 
Roads and highways  -2.39  47  2.01  REJ. H0 
Railways and underground   -0.68  8  2.31  ACC. H0 
Telecommunication infrastructures*  2.18  24  2.06  REJ. H0 
Industries and other productive investments  0.30  50  2.01  ACC. H0 
Overall sample*  1.978 205  1.97  1)  
EU and WB
2) 
Energy transport and distribution  -1.14  15  2.13  ACC. H0 
Energy production  -1.03  20  2.09  ACC. H0 
Roads and highways  -5.39  123  1.98  REJ. H0 
Railways and underground   -1.32  48  2.01  ACC. H0 
Ports, airports*   2.27  18  2.10  REJ. H0 
Water supply, transport and distribution*  2.28  25  2.06  REJ. H0 
Industries and other productive investments  -1.45  10  2.23  ACC. H0 
Overall sample  -4.54 279  1.97 REJ.  H0  
Notes: see Tab.4 
1) H0 should be rejected, but we do not thrust this result, because calculated t is approximatively 
equal to tα/2   
                                                 
11 For the overall sample and for heteroschedastic sectors the results are less clear cut, however it is still 
true that we observe greater variance with the ERRs than with the FRRs 
12 For example we have found that for the same country and sector, different shadow wages or other 
shadow prices are often used in different projects without a clear structural reason for such differences. 
Further research is needed on this point. It may include a comparison of the cost-benefit analysis 
handbooks internally used by each institution, and the study of a sample of projects in order to see how 
in practice appraisal guidelines were interpreted by project examiners. We feel that the latter process is a 
main source of inconsistency, rather than fundamental differences in CBA methods.   19
2) Projects approved in fiscal years 1988-97 
* these sectors are heteroschedastic. 
 
 
5. The wedge between FRR and ERR. 
 
We wish now to compare financial and economic rates of return. This is possible only 
for EU and EBRD, because the World Bank, while calculates FRR for each and every 
project, apparently does not record it for further analysis by OED.  
 
As mentioned above, conceptually the difference between FRR and ERR is that the 
former is an internal rate of return based on observed prices and tariffs, without any 
attempt to consider the opportunity costs of inputs and outputs and to include positive 
or negative externalities arising from the project. In contrast, ERR should be calculated 
using, whenever this is relevant, a shadow price reflecting opportunity costs of   
resources used by the project or created by it as a result of purchases and sales. 
Moreover the economic analysis of project should include any increases or decreases of 
quantities of goods  in the economy for third parties if generated by the project and not 
accounted for by market transactions or any other form of monetary compensation.  
 
Thus, any difference between FRR and ERR must be always seen as the result of using 
a different set of prices when considering the variations in quantities of projects inputs 
and outputs. Typical examples of corrections of observed prices are shadow prices for 
labour under a régime of unemployement, corrections for custom duties and other 
indirect taxes, correction for public tariffs or monopoly prices, etc. Corrections for 
externalities can be considered as way to give an accounting price to goods otherwise 
priced zero in financial analysis.  
 
As a consequence we can say that price distortions (including taxes on goods and 
factors of production) and externalities create a wedge between observed and economic 
values (price times quantities) and that this wedge is measured by the difference 
between FRR and ERR.
13 
 
We report in Tab. 9 a standardized measure of the wedge (ERR-FRR)/FRR for EU and 
EBRD. For two sectors (roads and highways, railways and underground) we can 
compare directly EU and EBRD wedges: the difference is very wide.  
Tipically the shadow price of time savings in transport projects is estimated by income 
of users. This is obviously higher in Western Europe than in the Central and Eastern 
Europe or in the CIS Region and this may explain a larger wedge in Western Europe, 
where tariffs are generally low. Moreover EBRD transport projects show rather 
surprisingly high financial rates of return, perhaps because of high expectations of real 
tariff increase. In the EBRD sample the least wedge is with industry projects and this 
seems to be quite reasonable because of EBRD mandate(more on this below). 
 
Tab 8 Comparison between FRR and ERR: EBRD 
Sectors Project  n° FRR  ERR  (ERR-FRR)/FRR
                                                 
13 Again, the observed ex-ante or ex-post wedge is subject to measurement errors, depending upon the 
errors of FRR and ERR (particularly in the latter case systematic errors related to the kind of shortcuts or 
conventions used by the appraisers).   20
EBRD 
Energy transport and distribution  8  18.50  31.00  0.68 
Energy production  15  28.13  44.38  0.58 
Roads and highways  5  17.68  27.82  0.57 
Railways and underground   5  18.36  22.60  0.23 
Water supply, transport and distribution  1  15.00  25.90  0.73 
Telecommunication infrastructures  17  23.87  39.65  0.66 
Industrial estates and technological parks  2  14.00  20.00  0.43 
Industries and other productive investments  39  25.11  29.07  0.16 
Overall sample  93  23.61  33.76  0.43 
EU 
Roads and highways  11  3.9  18.4  3.69 
Railways and underground   31  6.6  14.4  1.19 
Ports, airports  9  9.7  18.2  0.87 
Overall sample  51  6.5 15.9  1.43 
Note: we take only the sector with a significant number of observations. 




To back our statement we report in the table 10, the results of a statistical test on the 
average difference between FRR and ERR, where we wish to check for the two 
hypothesis 
Η0 : µ1= µ2  or  µ1− µ2 = 0 
Η1 : µ1≠µ2 
where µ1 is the average of FRR and µ2 the average of ERR. 
 
The two samples have the same numerousness n, so under the assumption that the 
differences between the average of FRR and the average of ERR are normally 
distributed and are indipendent of each other we can use a paired t-test. 
 
We can calculate the value of the following statistics: 
 
[6]       t n−1 () =
Χ  1 − Χ  2 ( ) ∑ [ ]/n
X1 − X 2 ()
2 − X1 − X 2 () / n ∑ ∑
n −1
n  
Under the null hypothesis t is distributed as Student’s t with n-1 degrees of freedom. H0 
is rejected for both EU and EBRD. 
 
Tab.9 Comparison between ERR and FRR. 
  EU EBRD 
Sectors  Project n° FRR  ERR  Project n°  FRR  ERR 
Energy transport and distribution        8  18.5  31.0 
Energy production        15  28.1  44.4   21
Roads and highways  11  3.9  18.4       
Railways and underground   31  6.6  14.4       
Ports, airports   9  9.7  18.2       
Telecommunications infrastructures        17  23.9  39.7 
Industries and other productive investments        39  25.1  29.1 
 
Average difference (FRR-ERR)  -10.26  -12.12 
Standard deviation  3.70  5.69 
t   -4.805    -4.26 
t(n-1, α = 0.05) ±  4.303  ±  3.182 
Test result  Rej. H0  Rej. H0 
 
This result reveals that structural differences in projects populations, significant for 
FRRs, less significant for ERRs, generate a significant difference in the wedge between 
observed and shadow prices. 
 
 
6. Comparing ERR and RERR data. 
 
Re-estimated economic rates of return  are available for WB only. They are based on a 
new appraisal of the project at the time of its completion. In this sense they update cost 
and benefit estimates some years after the approval of the project, but cannot be 
considered always true ex-post data: these could be collected only some years after the 
project operations started. The European Commission is now considering to start this 
exercise for some of major projects, but data are not yet available. EBRD perhaps will 
start a similar exercise in future. 
 
In spite of these limitations, the comparison of World Bank ERR-RERR data may be of 
general interest, and it has still been the object of some study (Pohl G., Mihaljek D, 
1992). EU and EBRD (or other development agencies) may learn from World Bank 
experience in this area. 
 
Tab. 9 shows ERR and RERR for our samples. The difference between the two can be 
considered sector by sector and standardized as we did with the difference between 
ERR and FRR. Here we take (RERR-ERR)/ERR and we consider its width as a relative 
measure of  the initial forecasting error by the project appraisers (Tab. 10). 
 
TAB. 10 Comparison between ERR and RERR. (WBs sample) 
Sectors (RERR-ERR)/ERR 
  Approval fiscal year 
1988-97 
Fiscal year 90-97 
exit year 
Evaluated 1974 to 
present 
Energy transport and distribution  0.11  -0.05  -0.20 
Energy production  -0.19  -0.02  -0.13 
Roads and highways  0.01  -0.07  -0.06 
Railways and underground   -0.24  -0.35  -0.30 
Ports, airports   0.32  -0.06  -0.13 
Water supply, transport and 
distribution 
-0.39 -0.33  -0.38 
Telecommunication infrastructures  -0.18  -0.13  -0.05 
Industries and other productive 
investments 
-0.34 -0.35  -0.41   22
Overall sample  -0.04  -0.10  -0.14 
 
 
In the following table 11, we report the results of a statistical tests on the average 
differences. 
 
The test shows that for the sample of projects approved 1988-1997 there are no 
statistically significant differences between ERRs ex-ante and ex-post, while for the 
other groups of project we reject the null hypothesis
14. 
 
TAB. 11 WB. ERR ex-ante and ex-post. 
  Approval fiscal year 
1988-97 
Fiscal year 90-97 
exit year 
Evaluated 1974 to 
present 
Average difference  2.02  3.88  4.05 
Standard deviation of difference  5.28  3.48  2.73 
t   1.079  3.154  4.192 
t(7, α = 0.05) ±2.365  ±  2.365  ± 2.365 
Test result  Acc. H0  Rej. H0  Rej. H0 
 
However this result conceals wide intersectoral differences. Interestingly three sectors 
show systematically high forecasting errors: railways, water and industry. This result 
signals the need to study sector specific sources of forecasting errors. Data analysis may 
drive this to further research work. 
 
 
7. Intersectoral comparisons 
 
In order to see some implications of the above analysis at sectoral level we need to 
standardize some of the relevant data for the three sources. We avoid using sample 
averages to do this, because these are driven by two factors: first, as said above, EU 
does not use a cut-off rate, while EBRD and WB use both a 10% rate for ERR and 
FRR; second, the sectoral composition of the two samples is quite different. 
 
Thus we prefer to standardize data using the average returns of "industry projects" as 
benchmark. The reasons to do this are the following ones: it is likely that projects in 
this sector are more market oriented and then their forecasts are less depending upon 
special hyptheses on demand and prices; samples for industry are relatively large for all 
the three sources (however in relative terms, they are small for WB); in fact the distance 
between the averages of FRR and ERR for the three source is limited. For EU we use as 
a benchmark FRR instead of ERR because these were not calculated for most industry 
projects.  
 
Results are shown in Table 12, 13 and briefly discussed below. 
 
TAB. 12 Comparisons of standardized FRRs and ERRs 
 FRR  sector i /FRR sector 9 ERR sector i /ERR sector 99 
Sectors EBDR  EU  EBRD EU
1  WB
2 
                                                 
14 This is a rather interesting result that may need some interpretation. The 1988-97 sample is more 
recent and smaller than the other ones. Is there a trend towards better predictability of project returns, e.g. 
because of greater macroeconomic stability? A larger sample may be necessary to discuss the conjecture.   23
Energy transport and distribution  0.93  0.26  1.25  0.72  0.86 
Energy production  1.11  0.55  1.55  0.60  0.55 
Roads and highways  0.76  0.20  0.82  0.95  1.25 
Railways and underground   0.79  0.33  0.75  0.85  0.97 
Ports, airports   1.12  0.50  3.49  0.89  0.87 
Water supply, transport and distribution  0.65  -0.05  0.90  0.97  0.40 
Telecommunication infrastructures  1.18  ..  1.34  ..  0.90 
Industries and other productive investments  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Notes: 1 For EU we used as a benchmark FRR instead ERR of industry (see in the text). 
           2 projects for fiscal year 88 
 
 
TAB. 13 WB. RERRsector i /RERRsector 9 
Sectors Approval  fiscal 
year 1988-97 
Fiscal year 90-
97 exit year 
Evaluated 1974 to 
present 
Energy transport and distribution  1.44  1.22  1.23 
Energy production  0.68  0.87  0.94 
Roads and highways  1.92  1.96  1.93 
Railways and underground   1.12  0.96  1.07 
Ports, airports   1.74  1.37  1.53 
Water supply, transport and distribution  0.37  0.49  0.54 
Telecommunication infrastructures  1.12  1.25  1.43 
Industries and other productive investments  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Notes: Industries and other productive investments captures less than 10% of the WB sample 
 
 
First, as for the financial rates of return, available for EBRD and EU, they respectively 
broadly cover projects in Eastern Europe and regions lagging behind in Western 
Europe. When we use Industry as a benchmark, there is a striking confirm that the 
expected returns of infrastructure projects in Eastern Europe are much higher than in 
Objective 1 regions in the EU.  
 
The sector for both institutions showing the least standardized returns is Water (2/3 of 
the benchmark for EBRD and no return at all, or slightly negative for EU). The 
difference between projects sponsored by the two institutions, may pick up totally 
different trends in expected tariffs (an expectation that may be interesting to study per 
se), but the similar position in the ranking of the FRRs may show the persistent 
difficulty of Water industry projects to have returns similar to those of other sectors. 
The wedge between financial and economic rates of return almost disappears for both 
the EU and EBRD in Water projects, thus confirming that the key issue underlying the 
results are low tariffs: when shadow tariffs of a sort are used in economic analysis, 
water projects have returns close to those of Industry. But surprisingly, the World Bank 
Water projects still show very low standardized economic returns, by far the minimum 




Sectors closest to the financial benchmark for EU and EBRD are Energy production, 
Energy distribution, and Ports and Airports. In fact the returns for EBRD projects even 
exceed those of Industry (perhaps because some of the projects are of incremental 
                                                 
15 An example of calculation from one study is as follow: the water project expects to earn an ERR 
slightly beyond the 10% threshold after estimating the willingness to pay as a shadow tariff: but 
willingness to pay may fail to capture large externalities of Water projects in less developing countries. 
Perhaps water project analysis needs a methodological re-consideration.   24
nature and capture large benefits with limited costs). When available, 
Telecommunication data also show high returns. However, when considering ERRs, 
again the World Bank sample shows lower returns. A cursory reading of some project 
reports reinforces the view that it would be useful for the WB to publish separate data 
on FRRs and ERRs, and to achieve greater standardization in the calculation of shadow 
prices for Energy.  
 
Quite interesting are also comparisons of returns for Roads and for Railways. Financial 
returns are relatively low, both for EBRD and EU projects, as compared with Industry 
projects. However the wedge between ERR and FRR is very wide for EU, and very 
modest for EBRD. Again this may reflect different expectations of tariff increase. ERRs 
for World Bank projects are high, both as compared with the benchmark and with the 
other two institutions
16.  
Tab. 14 shows sector rankings: it confirms that FRRs for EU and EBRD, while so 
different in absolute levels are consistent; however when we look at ERRs, ordering 
consistency between the two European institutions is destroyed. When we consider also 
the World Bank, EU data are closer to the WB data than EBRD. We interpret this as a 
further indication of higher inconsistency in cost-benefit analysis than in financial 
analysis.  
 
TAB. 14 Sector rankings 
Sector FRR  ERR 
  EBRD EU EBRD EU  WB 
Energy transport and distribution  4 5 2 6 5 
Energy production  2 2 1 7 6 
Roads and highways  6 6 5 3 1 
Railways and underground   5 4 6 5 3 
Ports, airports   1  3 n.a. 4  4 
Water supply, transport and distribution  7 7 4 2 7 
Industries and other productive investments  3 1 3 1 2 
n.a.: not available 
 
Many of the above mentioned comparisons may be more interesting when discussed 
using ex post returns as well. As said unfortunately these are available for the WB only, 
and just for the ERRs. We discussed these data already in section 5 where we observed 
that apparently the forecasting error diminished for more recent years. When we look at 
sectors, the highest error is with Industry, the least with Roads. We suspect that the 
latter is influenced by the fact that ex-post actual demand is not recorded, while actual 
revenues for other sectors, particularly of Industry or Railways are easier to observe. 
However the distribution of forecasting error across sector shows in general large 
differences that may need specific inquiry. 
 
Finally, when we look at ex-post returns against the Industry ERR benchmark, a clear 
and consistent ranking across sectors appears over time: the most socially profitable 
projects in the WB portfolio are Roads and Highways (two times the return of 
Industry), Ports and Airports, Energy distribution and Telecommunication 
infrastructures: all these sectors show higher returns than Industy projects. Railways 
                                                 
16 The methodology is a rather standard one, and very similar to that in use in the two European 
institutions. However it seems that WB results are strongly influenced by shadow wages, quite low in 
countries with high unemployement.   25
show returns close to those of Industry, Energy Production shows returns decreasing 
over time, while Water confirms to be, it seems, a low return sector. Again, we suspect 
that these results, that as far as we know are new, signal that either the portfolio is sub-
optimal in terms of the maximum rate of return, or - and more probably - that ERR 
calculation fails in some cases to capture important externalities, or is based on ad hoc 
sectoral assumptions. This point is further discussed below.  
 
 
8. Summary of results, concluding remarks and implications for project analysis 
 
This paper has explored a simple approach to using rates of return as the starting point 
for the formulation of important questions concerning the appraisal and planning of 
development projects. We have suggested some testable  propositions in the standard 
cost-benefit analysis framework arising when one consider a large project portfolio, in 
contrast to the consideration of individual project returns as uncomparable performance 
measures. 
 
We have suggested the following step-by-step procedure. 
 
a) We have proposed to start from project returns in financial analysis and then to move 
to economic returns.  
 
b)We need to know whether there are sectors for which ERRs are systematically 
(across periods of time, countries, sources) higher or lower than a benchmark level. We 
propose to use Industry as this benchmark.  
 
c)  When we discover that for example, Water and sanitation projects ERRs show 
sistematically relative low returns as compared with Industry there are just two 
possible explanations (not mutually exclusive): either social benefits of these 
projects are truly low relative to those of, e.g., Industry, or the method of analysis of 
their benefits fails to capture external benefits that accrue to society.  
 
d)  Should we find that the latter is true, we should - if possible - revise the method of 
analysis (for example, with a shadow price for the health impact of clean water: 
something that is no more difficult to guess than the money value of accidents 
avoided in highways projects). The most effective way to explore this issue would 
be to extract samples of project reports by sectors and compare how crucial 
variables were included in the calculation of FRR and particularly of ERR. 
Examples of these variables are the shadow price of labour, the value of time, 
willingness to pay for outputs, the treatment of taxation, etc. In our opinion, 
procedural consistency is here more important than a perhaps impossible exactitude. 
 
We think the heuristic approach we have outlined could be of some importance for 
institutions committed to development that need to appraise and implement a wide 
range of projects, from telecommunications to sewers, or from oil extraction to 
hospitals. 
 
For the particular set of the data we studied, our main findings are the following ones: 
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a) EBRD sponsored projects have an expected financial rate of return two times the EU 
projects co-financed by Structural Funds: this is not surprising because EBRD accepts 
projects that have a FRR in excess of 10% and disburses loans, while the EU has no 
threshold and delivers capital grants. 
 
b) the difference between the two samples was tested, and found statistically significant 
both for the overall portofolio and for each of 7 comparable sectoral partitions 
 
c) less obviously, ex-ante economic rates rates of return of EBRD projects are much 
higher than for EU projects, while those of World Bank projects lie often (i.e. for most 
sectors and for the overall sample) in between those of the other institutions 
 
d) while the absolute difference between the ERRs of EU and EBRD is as large as the 
difference between the FRRs, it is impossible to reject the hypothesis that the true 
difference is zero for 4 out of 5 comparable sectors: basically cost-benefit analysis 
introduces additional variability in the data, as compared with financial analysis. The 
comparison of EU and EBRD data on economic rates of return respectively with the 
World Bank sample shows that the null hypothesis (no average difference) is rejected 
for 7 sectors and accepted for 6 sectors. 
 
e) after standardization by using Industry sector as a benchmark, we observe that for 
EBRD and EU the wedge between financial and economic return is wide: 43% for the 
EBRD and 167% for the EU. For both institutions the difference is statistically 
significant. We suspect that a wider difference in the EU projects is explained by two 
factors: a wide gap between actual and shadow tariffs; and a high opportunity cost of 
time savings in transport projects.  
 
f) the difference between ex-ante ex-post rate of return can be tested for the World 
Bank only. We tested three samples: for the larger one starting from year 1974 the 
forecasting error is 14%. For more recent project vintages the error is smaller and 
statistically not significant. However forecasts are consistently less accurate for some 
sectors: railways, water, industry. 
 
g) in order to study variations of project returns across sectors we used, as said, 
Industry as a benchmark. We find that ranking across is sector is preserved in the 
comparison between financial returns of EU and EBRD projects: rail, water and roads 
show low returns relative to industry. 
 
h) however when we turn to economic rate of return the pattern is not preserved: 
rankings of EU and EBRD sectors are quite different. When compared with World 
Bank data we find greater similarity between EU and World Bank sectoral returns, than 
between the latter and EBRD. This confirms the overall impression that EBRD projects 
expected economic returns are not just very high, but also they tell a rather peculiar 
story.  
 
Obviously these results depend upon the particular data sets we have considered and do 
not imply any general proposition on the overall projects-portfolio or the international 
institutions. Some of these results are interesting and new, but our main objective was 
to show that with limited cumulative information on just four rates of return on project   27
samples it is possible to focus on important policy issues. Let us turn to these more 
general implications.  
 
First, financial rates of returns should always be the starting point for project analysis: 
these were available for EU and EBRD samples, but not for WB. Using industry FRRs 
as a benchmark, it was easy to discover that EBRD has in all other sectors much higher 
expectations than EU. Is this justified by the nature of the projects or by differences in 
appraisal optimism? The second question would be answered by the regular collection 
of ex-post FRRs, something that we would strongly suggest. The first question may 
imply a more detailed analysis of individual projects. In any case, differences between 
expectations in Western Europe and Eastern Europe seem to be very large indeed. It 
would be extremely useful for the World Bank to build a FRR database as well, in order 
to see how their data compare with European development projects.  
 
Second, we have seen some similarities and differences between ex-ante economic rates 
of return between EBRD, WB, and EU. While it is difficult to compare directly ERRs 
across sectors (and across different institutions), it is again possible to standardize data 
using as a benchmark those sectors were price distortions are least and were there is 
more factor mobility: this may be the case of industry. Ranking average ERRs ratios 
relatively to ERR of industry projects gives an indication of which infrastructure or 
other sectors appear to signal statistically significant relative high or low returns. This 
information cannot be used at its face-value. Either these variations reflect true 
differences in social returns, or they reflect methodological bias (or both). This should 
then be the starting point for a review process and for further analysis. 
We have found that while we can reject the hypothesis that average financial rate of 
returns differences across institution are zero, this hypothesis is accepted for economic 
rates of return, despite widely different average values. This suggests that inconsistent 
cost-benefit analysis may introduce additional variability in the ERRs samples and calls 
for a review of CBA use within each institution. 
 
Third, the intersectoral wedge between financial and economic rates of return may be 
an useful indicator of the width of the correction that cost-benefit analysis introduces on 
observed prices: FRR data should be calculated and compared with ERR for samples 
comprising the same projects. This will give project appraisers and evaluators a clearer 
picture of both price distortions and of methods to deal with them in project analysis. 
These data are available for EBRD and for a limited number of EU projects and reveal 
interesting differences across sectors and across the two sources. For example, the 
average correction for EU roads and railways is a multiple of EBRD corresponding 
data, and this is surprising because the ERRs of the two samples are not so distant. 
 
Fourth, the average gap between ex ante and ex post rates of return (possibly both for 
FRRs and ERRs) points to forecasting errors: above average errors across sectors (or 
countries or institutions) may suggest a revision of appraisal methods. While we do not 
have any information on ex-post financial rates of return, the OED at the World Bank 
collects regularly information on RERRs, and analyse them in different ways. We have 
reported their results and tested them. The average difference between ERR and RERR 
in more recent years is diminishing, so much that in the most recent (and smallest) 
sample there is virtually no statistical difference between the two values. However, the 
sectoral pattern shows striking variations. In some sectors there is a constant forecasting 
optimism around 30% or more of the ex-ante ERR ( Industry, water, railways), in others   28
forecasting error is apparently more limited (roads). Again, this should be the starting 
point for further analysis.  
 
Obviously only sector and country specific studies can ascertain the reasons of the 
problems revealed by the above mentioned sequence of tests, and this is beyond the 
scope of the present paper. However, the framework we propose shows how to use 
cumulative information arising from cost-benefit analysis to achieve greater appraisal 
consistency and improve the composition of the development projects portfolio.  
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Statistical Appendix 
 
TAB.A1 Test for variance ERR 
SECTORS F  Degree  of  freedom F(α)  Test results 
 n 1-1 n2-1  α=0.05   
EBRD and EU 
Energy transport and distribution  1.93  10  2  19.40  ACC. H0 
Energy production  16.72  14  2  19.42  ACC. H0 
Roads and highways  1.86  90  14  2.20  ACC. H0 
Railways and underground   1.90  46  6  3.74  ACC. H0 
Industries and other productive investments  4.64  39  1  251.10  ACC. H0 
Overall sample  2.27  108  182  1.32  REJ. H0 
EBRD and WB
1) 
Energy transport and distribution 1.10  10  13  2.67  ACC.  H0 
Energy production  36.27  14  18  2.29  REJ. H0 
Roads and highways  2.24  33  14  2.29  ACC. H0 
Railways and underground   2.02  2  6  5.14  ACC. H0 
Telecommunication infrastructures  6.57  17  7  3.48  REJ. H0 
Industries and other productive investments  2.18  41  9  2.82  ACC. H0 
Overall sample  2.75  108  97  1.39  REJ. H0 
WB
1) and EU 
Energy transport and distribution  1.75  13  2  19.42  ACC. H0 
Energy production  2.17  2  18  3.55  ACC. H0 
Roads and highways  1.20  33  90  1.57  ACC. H0 
Railways and underground   1.06  2  46  3.20  ACC. H0 
Ports. Airports   6.46  13  5  4.65  REJ. H0 
Water supply. transport and distribution  25.23  22  3  8.65  REJ. H0 
Industries and other productive investments  2.13  9  1  240.50  ACC. H0 
Overall sample  1.21 182  97  1.35  ACC.  H0 
Notes: 
1) projects approved in fiscal year 1988-97. 
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Energy transport and 
distribution 
4 5.1  (-4.7,  14.9)  6.2  38.4 0.13  0.4 
Energy production  2 10.8  n.c.  0.0 0.0  n.c.  0.9 
Roads and highways  12  3.9  (2.0, 5.7)  2.9  8.5  0.46  0.3 
Railways and 
underground  
34 6.6 (5.1,  8.0)  4.2  17.5  0.37  0.5 
Ports, airports   9 9.7  (6.4,  12.9)  4.2  17.9 0.54  0.8 
Water supply, transport 
and distribution 
10 -1.0 (-6.7,  4.7)  8.1  64.9  -0.02  -0.1 
Industries and other 
productive investments 
64 19.6  (15.9,  23.2)  14.6  212.1  0.09  1.6 
Overall sample  135 12.2 (9.9,  14.4)  12.9  166.2  0.07  1.0 
EBRD 
Energy transport and 
distribution 
10 21.61  (15.6,  27.6)  8.34  69.52  0.31  0.94 
Energy production  19  25.71  (18.8, 32.6)  14.23  202.49  0.13  1.12 
Roads and highways  5  17.68  (13.5, 21.8)  3.35  11.21  1.58  0.77 
Railways and 
underground  
5 18.36  (8.5,  28.2)  7.93  62.85  0.29  0.80 
Ports, airports   6  26.05  (20.4, 31.6)  5.35  28.58  0.91  1.13 
Water supply, transport 
and distribution 
13 15.07  (11.7,  18.4)  5.61  31.49  0.48  0.65 
Telecommunication 
infrastructures 
29 27.41  (21.5,  33.3)  15.53  241.04  0.11  1.19 
Industries and other 
productive investments 
83 23.16  (21.3,  25.0)  8.52  72.52  0.32  1.01 
Overall sample  170  23.04  (21.4, 24.7)  10.79  116.47  0.20  1.00 
Notes: Coefficient of variation = X 
S
2 ; Standard deviation = 
nΣX
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TAB.A.3 Economic rates of return. 















Energy transport and 
distribution 
3 14.19 (1.4,  26.9)  9.36 87.69 0.16  0.85 
Energy production  3  11.70  (2.9, 20.5)  6.48 42.00 0.28  0.70 
Roads and highways  91  18.63  (16.3, 20.9)  13.23 174.97 0.11  1.11 
Railways and 
underground  
47 16.68  (13.7,  19.6) 11.83 139.88 0.12  0.99 
Ports, airports   14  17.43  (11.6, 23.3)  12.43 154.56 0.11  1.04 
Water supply, transport 
and distribution 
23 18.92  (14.5,  23.3) 12.31 151.43 0.12  1.13 
Industries and other 
productive investments 
2 15.17  (0.10,  30.2)  7.30 53.35 0.28  0.90 
Overall sample  183  17.19  (15.5, 19.8)  11.73 137.55 0.12  1.00 
EBRD 
Energy transport and 
distribution 
11 35.7  (28.7,  42.7) 13.01 169.22 0.21  1.26 
Energy production  15  44.4  (32.4, 56.4)  26.50 702.19 0.06  1.57 
Roads and highways  15  23.5  (19.1, 27.9)  9.69 93.84 0.25  0.83 
Railways and 
underground  
7 21.4  (15.3,  27.6)  8.58 73.62 0.29  0.76 
Water supply, transport 
and distribution 
1  25.9  n.c. n.c.  n.c. n.c.  0.91 
Telecommunication 
infrastructures 
18 38.6  (31.9,  45.3) 16.48 271.46 0.14  1.36 
Industries and other 
productive investments 
42 28.3  (23.4,  33.2) 15.74 247.7 0.11  0.89 
Overall sample  109  31.8 (28.5, 35.2)  17.68 312.5 0.10  1.00 
WB (Approved fiscal year 1988-1997) 
Energy transport and 
distribution 
14 22.94  (17.2,  28.6)  12.39  153.51  0.15  0.92 
Energy production  19  14.69  (12.9, 16.4)  4.40  19.36  0.76  0.59 
Roads and highways  34  33.34  (29.1, 37.5)  14.51  210.54  0.16  1.33 
Railways and 
underground  
3 25.97  (9.4,  42.5)  12.20  148.84 0.17  1.04 
Ports, airports   6  23.15  (19.3, 27.1)  4.89  23.91  0.97  0.92 
Water supply, transport 
and distribution 
4 10.68 (8,  13.3) 2.45  6.00  1.78  0.43 
Telecommunication 
infrastructures 
8 24.11  (19.9,  28.3)  6.43  41.34  0.58  0.96 
Industries and other 
productive investments 
10 26.71  (20.6,  32.7)  10.58  111.94  0.24  1.07 
Overall sample  98  25.03  (22.9, 27.2)  10.66  113.65  0.22  1.00 
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Approved fiscal year 1988-1997 
Energy transport and 
distribution 
14 22.94 (17.2,  28.6)  12.39  153.51  0.15  0.92 
Energy production  19  14.69  (12.9, 16.4)  4.40  19.36  0.76  0.59 
Roads and highways  34  33.34  (29.1, 37.5)  14.51  210.54  0.16  1.33 
Railways and underground   3  25.97  (9.4, 42.5)  12.20  148.84  0.17  1.04 
Ports, airports   6  23.15  (19.3, 27.1)  4.89  23.91  0.97  0.92 
Water supply, transport 
and distribution 
4 10.68  (8,  13.3) 2.45 6.00  1.78  0.43 
Telecommunication 
infrastructures 
8 24.11  (19.9,  28.3)  6.43 41.34  0.58  0.96 
Industries and other 
productive investments 
10 26.71 (20.6,  32.7)  10.58  111.94  0.24  1.07 
Overall sample  98  25.03  (22.9, 27.2)  10.66  113.65  0.22  1.00 
Exit fiscal year 1990-1997 
Energy transport and 
distribution 
46 22.39 (17.7,  27.1)  19.05  362.73  0.06  0.98 
Energy production  65  15.29  (13.7, 16.7)  7.75  60.10  0.25  0.67 
Roads and highways  78  36.61  (32.9, 40.2)  19.23  369.88  0.10  1.61 
Railways and underground   14  25.73  (20.9, 30.5)  10.12  102.33  0.25  1.13 
Ports, airports   27  25.22  (23.5, 26.9)  5.31  28.20  0.89  1.11 
Water supply, transport 
and distribution 
28 12.78 (10.6,  14.9)  6.89 47.50  0.27  0.56 
Telecommunication 
infrastructures 
22 24.78 (22.2,  27.3)  6.96 48.48  0.51  1.09 
Industries and other 
productive investments 
25 26.57 (20.3,  32.8)  18.18  330.39  0.08  1.17 
Overall sample  305  22.77  (21.4, 24.1)  14.16  200.47  0.11  1.00 
All evaluated projects 1974-1997 
Energy transport and 
distribution 
126 21.03 (18.6,  23.4)  16.45  270.60  0.08  0.97 
Energy production  187  14.80  (14.1, 15.5)  5.97  35.64  0.42  0.68 
Roads and highways  337  28.17  (26.6, 29.7)  17.88  319.69  0.09  1.30 
Railways and underground   77  20.74  (19.4, 22)  6.86  47.06  0.44  0.95 
Ports, airports   95  24.09  (22.6, 25.6)  8.81  77.62  0.31  1.11 
Water supply, transport 
and distribution 
98 11.84  (10.8,  12.9)  6.29 39.56  0.30  0.54 
Telecommunication 
infrastructures 
86 20.55  (19.2,  21.8)  7.30 53.29  0.39  0.95 
Industries and other 
productive investments 
104 23.02 (20.1,  25.9)  17.99  323.64  0.07  1.06 
Overall sample  1110  21.73  (22.4, 21.1)  13.44  180.75  0.12  1.00 
Notes: see Tab.2 
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